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Abstract—Radiation found in terrestrial and space environ-
ments can induce errors into SRAM-based FPGAs. Replication
of circuitry can be used mask and detect these errors to improve
reliability or availability. This work advances the understanding
and implementation of partial circuit replication in SRAM-based
FPGAs. Partial circuit replication is the replication of a subset
of the components in a circuit. A reliability model is presented
that evaluates the reliability benefit of partial circuit replication.
The model suggests that the reliability benefit is inversely related
to the portion of the circuit replicated. A partial triple module
redundancy case study is also presented that evaluates several
different selection algorithms. Random selection was found to
be ineffective and maximizing protected routes while minimizing
inserted voters provided a high return, reducing failure likelihood
by 20% with only 9% coverage. A final study applied duplication
with compare to an FPGA-based networking system to detect
persistent silent network disruptions. A coverage of 29% was
able to detect 45% of these failures in neutron radiation testing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radiation found in space and terrestrial environments can
induce errors that corrupt circuits implemented on SRAM-
based FPGAs [1]. Radiation can cause soft errors in static
random access memory (SRAM) cells by inverting their stored
value [2]. SRAM-based field programmable gate arrays (FP-
GAs) use a large array of these memory cells to store device
configuration. When this configuration memory (CRAM) be-
comes corrupted, the circuit implemented by the FPGA may
also become corrupt, which may result in circuit failure.
Failures are errors that cannot be tolerated, and errors are
caused by faults. When radiation inverts the value stored in a
memory cell, it introduces a fault. A fault is a condition that
could cause a circuit to fail [3]. Faults can cause errors, which
are observable deviations from expected behavior. Errors can
cause failures when their behavior falls outside of the func-
tional specification of the circuit or system in which the circuit
resides. Some errors are tolerable while others are not.
Several techniques have been developed to mask and detect
radiation-induced errors in SRAM-based FPGA designs. In
particular, circuit redundancy has been used for this. The basic
idea of using circuit redundancy for detecting or masking
errors is that errors can be detected or masked by comparing
the outputs of identical circuits. Errors are detected though
the use of two copies and errors are masked through the use
of three or more copies. The use of two copies for detecting
errors is known as duplication with compare (DWC) [4] and
the use of three copies for masking errors is known as triple
modular redundancy (TMR) [5].
Figure 1, shows a basic implementation of TMR. Here
circuit components are triplicated and voters are inserted that
propagate the dominate value received by the three copies.
Propagating the dominate value masks errors within a single
circuit copy. So long as two or more copies and the corre-
sponding voter are error free, the resulting output of the circuit
will also be error free. The voters themselves can also be
replicated where possible to avoid single points in the circuit







Fig. 1. Spacial TMR with Triplicated Voters
Figure 2 shows a basic DWC implementation. Errors are
detected by comparing the output of the two identical circuits.
Discrepancy are captured in a subsequent register. The detec-
tion logic is also duplicated so that errors that originate in
the detection logic can be to filtered out [4]. In [4], DWC
was applied to all circuit components in a set of circuits
implemented on an SRAM-based FPGA, and DWC was able
to accurately detect 99.9% of all SEU-induced circuit failures.
Both TMR and DWC are effective, but not every appli-
cation can afford the overhead that these techniques require.















Fig. 2. DWC using Redundant Detection Logic
many resources to implement respectively. Beyond increasing
resource utilization, these techniques can negatively impact
timing closure and power consumption. Some resources, such
as multi-gigabit transceivers, clock managers, and analog-to-
digital converters, cannot be replicated within a single chip.
In situations where full circuit replication is infeasible
partial circuit replication can be used. After a circuit is
implemented on SRAM-based FPGAs, often times a signif-
icant amount of resources remain that are not utilized. The
left over resources can be dedicated to replicating portions
of the implemented circuit. By replicating portions of the
circuit, a portion of radiation-induced errors can be detected
or masked (depending on the replication scheme). This allows
any remaining resources to be dedicated to the improvement
of a circuit’s reliability or availability.
The studies presented in this work explore the use of
partial circuit replication for masking and detecting radiation-
induced errors in SRAM-based FPGAs. Three studies are
included. The first study looks at adapting existing reliability
models to more accurately reflect the benefits available from
partial circuit replication. The second study explores several
selections algorithms for the application of partial TMR. The
final study examines the use of partial DWC for reducing the
likelihood of undetected failures in a commercial FPGA-based
networking system. Theoretical benefits and practical applica-
tions are covered to improve the state of the art understanding
and implementation of these two powerful error masking and
detection techniques: partial TMR and partial DWC.
II. METRICS
In order to understand the concern concern that radiation
presents, the likelihood of radiation-induced failure must be
measured. Measuring this likelihood provides quantitative
data. These data, in turn, provide context for concern. It is also
through measurement that various approaches for lowering
the likelihood can be evaluated in their effectiveness. Thus,
addressing the concerns of radiation-induced failure depends
heavily upon measurement.
All measurement approaches and metrics share a common
theme: quantifying the probability of failure or success. The
likelihood of radiation-induced failure hinges on many dif-
ferent factors and varies greatly between circuits and envi-
ronments. The goal of this section is to provide a unified
view of available measurement techniques and metrics. This
understanding greatly aids the subsequent discussion.
The likelihood of failure is presented in terms of reliability
and availability. Reliability is the probability of no failure
within a given operating period, and availability is the prob-
ability that a circuit is operating correctly at any point in
time [7]. Availability takes into consideration reliability and
the amount of time it takes to perform a repair when a failure
occurs. Availability improves when reliability improves or
when the time it takes to make a repair is reduced.
One way that the reliability of a circuit can be estimated is
through fault injection. The type of fault injection referred to
here is the purposeful introduction of faults into a circuit to
emulate, or mimic, the effects of radiation in the circuit [8].
This provides a discrete sampling of the circuit’s radiation
response and can be used to estimate the reliability of the
circuit. The reliability of non-redundant simplex circuit is
typically modeled using the exponential distribution [7]. Thus,
the reliability of the circuit as a function of time in days is
R(t) = exp(−λt) (1)
where λ is the constant failure rate of circuit.
Often times, the average time to failure is more useful
for comparison than the time dependent reliability function.
The mean time to failure (MTTF) can be obtained from the





It also can be estimated by averaging the time to failure of
several independent experiments [9]. MTTF is reported in units
of time and can be scaled to any appropriate timescale.
A metric related to MTTF is failures in time or FIT. This
metric is heavily adopted by industry. It is the number of
failures per billion hours of operation [10]. The relationship
between the two metrics is shown in Equation 3.
FIT =
1, 000, 000, 000 Hours
MTTF in Hours
(3)
For comparison, a MTTF of 1000 years equates to 114 FIT
approximately. FIT of memory arrays are typically reported
in terms of FIT per Mbit (106 bits) and are normalized to a
reference environment like New York City at sea level [11].
A golden standard for radiation hardness assurance is accel-
erated radiation testing [8], [11], [12]. Accelerated radiation
testing measures the likelihood of failure in terms of cross
section, which can be converted to MTTF. Cross section is
a hypothetical area (measured in cm2) that would result in
failure should an energetic particle pass through it [2]. Flux is
the number of particles that pass through a cm2 per second.





This conversion applies readily to a high-energy neutron cross
section but a more sophisticated approach is needed for heavy-
ion cross sections and other forms of radiation testing [13].
III. PARTIAL CIRCUIT REPLICATION MODELING
Reliability models can be used to evaluate the effectiveness
of partial circuit replication. Effectiveness is evaluated in terms
of improvement in circuit reliability or availability. Ultimately,
the goal is to improve a circuit’s reliability or availability as
much as possible within a given set of constraints. Reliability
models provide a theoretical threshold for the amount of
improvement that can be expected, and they also lend guidance
to the application of these mitigation techniques.
A reliability model based on Markov chains has already
been developed for the application of full TMR with repair [9],
but the model lacks consideration for partial circuit replication.
Full TMR with repair applies TMR to all components in a
circuit and incorporates some kind of repair mechanism that is
able to fix a copy when it becomes corrupt. From this model,
the benefits and drawbacks of full TMR with repair can be
understood, but this classic model is incomplete. It does not
compensate for errors that can instantly compromise multiple
copies and it does not consider situations where only a fraction
of the original circuit is replicated. These shortcomings make
the model inadequate for understanding the full benefits and
drawbacks of partial circuit replication.
A simple, yet profound, modification can be made to the
aforementioned model to unlock hidden truths that accompany
the application of partial circuit replication. The modification
is the addition of a direct path from any functional state to
the failure state (see the dashed edges in Figure 3). This
modification is equivalent to adding a simplex (non-replicated)
component as a dependency. For the system to function cor-
rectly the replicated portion and non-replicated portion must
both be functional. This modification compensates for failure
modes that compromise multiple copies and it compensates







Fig. 3. Modified Markov Chain of TMR with Repair
The Markov chain shown in Figure 3 implements the
modified TMR with repair reliability model. The three states
represent a TMR system where: all three copies are function-
ing correctly (S0), only two of the three copies are functioning
correctly (S1), and where two or more of the copies are not
functioning correctly (S2). The failure rate of a single copy
is λ, the repair rate for a single copy is µ, and the additional
system wide failure rate is c. From S0 to S1 there is a 3λ rate
of transition because any one of the three working copies could
fail. Transitions from S1 to S0 have an occurrence rate of µ
representing the act of repairing a failed copy. The transition
rate from S1 to S2 is 2λ because only two functional copies
remain. The remaining transitions (from S0 and S1 to S2) have
a transition rate of c and represent events that causes multiple
copies to fail simultaneously or cause a non-replicated portion
of the circuit to fail.
From this model, the following reliability and MTTF equa-
tions are derived:
R(t) = (5)














λ2 + 10λµ+ µ2
MTTF =
c+ 5λ+ µ
c2 + 5cλ+ cµ+ 6λ2
(6)
Through variable substitution, these equations can be used
to model different applications. Without substitution, these
equations model a full TMR system with repair and addi-
tional susceptibility to common cause failure (CCF - where
a single event simultaneously compromises multiple copies).
Substituting λ for ρλ and c for (1− ρ)λ + c introduces a
portion variable, ρ, which reflects the amount of the original
circuit that has been replicated. ρ takes on a value from zero to
one. A value of one removes the substitution. The substitution
is not included in the above equations to lend simplicity to
their presentation, but it provides a more complete view.
Figure 4 presents the classic TMR reliability graph that
compares the reliability over time of a circuit in three different
configurations: TMR with repair, TMR without repair, and
in simplex. All three of the plotted functions can be derived






















Fig. 4. Classic TMR Reliability Graph
from Equation 5. This plot helps illuminate the relationships
between variables. In a system without repair, adjusting the
portion of the circuit that is replicated causes the reliability
function to morph between that of a simplex circuit and that
of a fully replicated circuit. Adding repair to a fully replicated
circuit causes the reliability function to morph towards that of
the TMR with repair function where the repair rate is 40×
greater than the failure rate of a single copy. As the repair
rate approaches instantaneous repair (or an infinite repair rate),
the reliability function continues upward as it approaches a
constant one (or no possibility of failure).
The c component is an instantaneous or non-redundant
failure rate. Including only c components reduces Equation 5
down to the reliability of a simplex circuit:
lim
λ→0+
R(t) = exp(−ct) (7)
Adding a c component on top of TMR with repair effectively
multiplies the TMR with repair reliability function by that of
a scaled simplex circuit. Doing so imposes a hard limit on the
improvement that increasing the repair rate can render.
The maximum obtainable MTTF can be found by taking the







Note that the maximum obtainable MTTF depends only on the
c component. This is significant. It means that the maximum
obtainable MTTF is limited by the amount of the circuit that
is not replicated, and it means that the severity of limitation is
extreme unless c is very small. The limit on MTTF improve-
ment for partial circuit replication is the inverse of one minus










Accordingly, if TMR is applied to 50% of the components
in a target circuit (a ρ of 0.5), then only a 2× improvement can
be expected. If 90% of the circuit is replicated, than a 10×
maximum improvement can be expected. At 99% coverage,
a 100× maximum improvement can be expect, and so forth
off to infinity. This outcome assumes that all component
contribute equally to the original failure rate and it does not
consider the increase in c that results from the addition of
reduction voters. It is an illustrative example of the amount of
coverage required for orders of magnitude improvement.
The subsequent study included in this paper expands this
outcome by considering both the marginal contribution of
individual components to the failure rate and the increase in c
that results from inserting reduction voters. It maybe possible
to disproportionately reduce the failure rate by replicating
subsets of the circuit that are more important than others.
The next study explores this possibility and demonstrates
achievement. That demonstration still agrees with the model,
but it is important to note that the coverage portion, ρ, relates
to the coverage of the original failure rate, not the quantitative
ratio of replicated components to total number of components.
While this section focuses primarily on modeling partial
TMR, many of the concepts and takeaways discussed are
applicable to partial circuit replication in general. Modeling
for partial DWC requires additional modifications. Partial
DWC does not improve reliability (more errors occur, half
of which are false positives due to the replication), but it can
improve availability by alerting the circuit to errors that would
otherwise go unnoticed. In this way, availability models are
needed. The main takeaway from such models is the same as
for partial TMR: the availability improvement of the circuit is
hard limited the portion of the circuit that is not replicated.
IV. PARTIAL TMR CASE STUDY
The effectiveness of partial circuit replication is greatly
influenced by component selection. Some selections are likely
to be more effective than others for a number of different
reasons. These reasons include the number of routes replicated,
the importance of the protected subset, and the amount of
supporting logic required such as reduction voters (where
signals transition from a triplicated region to a simplex region).
Variation in the circuits placement and routing implementation
can also affect the effectiveness of partial circuit replication.
The study presented here examines the impact of various
selection algorithms on the effectiveness of partial circuit repli-
cation for improving the reliability of a circuit implemented
on an SRAM-based FPGA. Effectiveness was determined by
measuring the reduction in neutron cross section rendered
by the application of partial TMR using the various selec-
tion algorithms. The study examines four types of selection
algorithms: combinational verses sequential logic, random,
maximizing protected routes while minimizing the insertion of
reduction voters, and feedback-based component relationships.
In this study, the objective of applying partial TMR to a
circuit implemented on an SRAM-based FPGA is to improve
the overall reliability of the entire circuit. This is different
than using partial TMR to reduce the likelihood of persistent
errors [14], [15] or using partial TMR to reduce the likelihood
of a specific failure mode. This study looks at the application
of partial TMR for reducing the likelihood of any error.
When partial TMR is applied to a circuit implemented
on an SRAM-based FPGA, some of the primitive compo-
nents used by the circuit are triplicated and some are not.
Primitive components vary from vendor to vendor. They are
the basic building blocks of a circuit and map to resources
available on the device. Primitive components include I/O re-
sources, buffers, clock managers, programmable lookup tables,
registers, memory blocks, and arithmetic units. Connections
between primitive components are made through a sea of
programmable interconnects and these routes are replicated
based on which components are selected for replication.
A simplified diagram of partial TMR is shown in Figure 5.
Connections between replicated components are considered
protected routes (or protected edges). Voters that transition a
signal from a replicated region to a non-replicated region are
considered to be reduction voters. Any non-replicated source
that drives replicated sinks is considered a non-TMR source,
and any non-replicated sink that is driven by a reduction voter
is considered a non-TMR sink. The occurrence counts of these
attributes in a partially replicated circuit are used as metrics














Fig. 5. Simplified Diagram of Partial TMR.
The benefit of partial circuit replication for improving
circuit reliability comes from replicating components in such
a way that errors are prevented from propagating beyond the
replicated boundary within the circuit. Replicating portions
of the circuit reduced the likelihood of radiation-induced
failure, but the insertion of additional logic to transition from
a replicated region to a non-replicated region (the use of a
reduction voter) increases the likelihood of radiation induced
failure. Thus, for partial TMR to be effective, the likelihood
of radiation-induced failure must be decreased more through
replication than it is increased through the insertion of voters.
It is hypothesized that maximizing the number of protected
routes and minimizing the number of inserted voters will pro-
vide the greatest amount of benefit for a given level of partial
TMR. The amount of partial TMR applied is determined by
the percent of components that are replicated. It is thought
that a significant portion of CRAM bits in an FPGA design
are dedicated to the support of programmable interconnect
points. Thus a large portion of the radiation-induced failure
likelihood may be due to upsets of CRAM bits associated with
routing. Within a single single, the number of protected routes
can vary greatly based on which components are selected
for replication. Thus one of the tested selection algorithms is
based on the principle of maximizing the number of protected
routes and minimizing the number of inserted voters.
A. Neutron Radiation Test
The neutron cross sections of several circuit variations were
measured in October 2019 at the Los Alamos Neutron Science
Center (LANSCE) (see Figure 6). LANSCE is a spallation
neutron source. The irradiation of chips electronics (ICE)
instruments have an energy spectra that is similar to a scaled
ground spectrum [11]. This make these instruments suitable for
measuring the average neutron cross section of an observable
event for a device deployed in terrestrial or high-altitude
applications. Different partial TMR selection schemes were
applied to the same circuit implemented in an SRAM-based
FPGA. The cross section of any failure in the circuit were
measured for each selection (including a baseline without any
replication). These measurements are then used along with the
previously mentioned attribute counts to evaluate and compare












Fig. 6. Neutron Radiation Test Setup
Neutron irradiation was selected for this study (as opposed
to proton or heavy ion) because this type of radiation is
an important part of evaluating the soft error characteristics
of FPGAs in terrestrial environments [11]. The techniques
developed in this study will likely be used in large-scale
deployments of circuits in terrestrial environments. Thus,
neutron irradiation is an apt form of radiation to use.
Figure 6 displays the setup of the test experiment. Here, the
test circuit is loaded onto five design under test boards. The
boards in the experiment are Nexus Video development boards,
which utilize Artix-7 200T FPGAs. The FPGAs are aligned
perpendicular to the 2-inch collimated neutron beam so that
beam passes directly through the devices. The distance of the
devices from the neutron source was used to appropriately
degrade the neutron flux measured at the device. The test
circuit is provided stimulus and monitored by development
boards placed outside of the neutron beam. A custom JTAG
configuration manager (not shown) monitors the occurrence of
radiation-induced upsets and orchestrates the flow of the test.
The test circuit has 256 instances of a group of interde-
pendent state machines known collectively as the “B13”. The
B13 comes from the ITC’99 benchmark suite [16] and was
formerly control circuitry for communicating with a weather
sensor. This design has been used in several FPGA reliability
studies [17]. A total of 36 design variants were tested including
the baseline circuit. A subset of results are included here for
brevity. Over the course of the entire test, a total of 3,052
TABLE I
NEUTRON RADIATION TEST RESULTS
Design Cross Section (95% Conf.) Cross Section Visual Cov. Red. Ret. Edg. Vot. S/S
Baseline 2.6± 0.3× 10−9 cm2 0% 0% – 0 0 0/0
All 3.8± 1.3× 10−10 cm2 100% 85% 0.85 234 9 10/9
Combinational 1.4± 0.4× 10−9 cm2 44% 44% 1.01 17 37 55/54
Registers 3.9± 1.0× 10−9 cm2 56% -52% -0.93 24 54 45/148
Random 9% 3.5± 0.7× 10−9 cm2 9% -37% -4.06 3 9 18/27
Random 20% 2.6± 0.6× 10−9 cm2 20% -2% -0.12 9 18 31/45
Random 38% 2.7± 0.6× 10−9 cm2 38% -3% -0.09 32 28 43/58
Random 50% 2.5± 0.5× 10−9 cm2 50% 4% 0.08 60 37 35/70
Random 75% 2.6± 0.6× 10−9 cm2 75% 0% -0.01 134 39 28/49
ILP 9% 2.1± 0.5× 10−9 cm2 9% 20% 2.27 20 3 4/6
ILP 20% 1.8± 0.4× 10−9 cm2 20% 31% 1.56 60 3 4/5
ILP 38% 2.0± 0.5× 10−9 cm2 38% 24% 0.64 101 2 12/4
ILP 50% 1.6± 0.4× 10−9 cm2 50% 40% 0.80 135 7 6/15
ILP 75% 8.5± 2.7× 10−10 cm2 75% 67% 0.89 191 4 11/5
SCC Largest 1.4± 0.3× 10−9 cm2 69% 46% 0.67 163 24 2/31
SCC Output 2.4± 0.5× 10−9 cm2 31% 8% 0.26 40 9 34/9
TF Level 1 1.4± 0.3× 10−9 cm2 64% 46% 0.72 149 18 8/21
TF Level 2 2.4± 0.4× 10−9 cm2 28% 7% 0.24 40 14 11/18
radiation induced upsets were observed under a total fluence
of 1.43×1012 n cm−2.
B. Results
The results from the radiation test are shown in Table I.
The left most column shows the design variation labeled by
the applied selection algorithms and accompanying level of
coverage. The next two columns are the measured neutron
cross section with a 95% confidence interval and a visual
representation for an at-a-glance comparison. The remaining
columns detail attributes of each variant for comparison and
include the following attributes: coverage (cov.), reduction
(red.), return or reduction divided by coverage (ret.), number
of protected edges (edg.), number of inserted reduction voters
(vot.), and the number of non-TMR sources and sinks (s/s).
The variants labeled “Baseline” and “All” provide important
reference points for comparing all of the remaining variants.
Baseline has no replication and is the reference point used to
determine how far the cross section is reduced (or expanded)
in subsequent variants. Replicating all components minus I/O
ports is able to reduce the cross-section by 85% (to 15% of its
original size). This is very likely the smallest the cross section
will be since subsequent variants will replicate only a subset
of components.
The next set of variants compared the selection of all
combinational circuit elements against the selection of all
sequential circuit elements. The combinational selection sur-
prisingly reduced the cross section by 44% even through it
required nearly as many reduction voters as the number of
components replicated. The combinational selection included
all look up tables in the design and provided a decent return
of 1.01. The sequential selection (all registers) yielded a
surprisingly poor result by proportionally increasing the cross
section nearly as much as the portion of the design replicated
(a 52% increase for a 56% coverage). Further study is needed
to understand the implications of these results.
The following three sets of circuit variants present the
findings from: random selection, integer linear programming
(ILP) selection targeting maximum edge protection and min-
imum reduction voter insertion, and feedback-based selection
algorithms respectively. Random selection proved ineffective.
It either increased the cross section or decreased it slightly.
This outcome shows that methodical selection is a must. The
ILP selection showed favorable results supporting the original
hypothesis. Here the original cross section was reduce 20%
through replicating only 9% of circuit components. That is
a return of 2.27, which is the largest return experienced by
any variant. The remaining ILP variants had sizable returns
as well. The final set of variants base their selection on
feedback found in the design. Feedback occurs whenever
an output signal from a component propagates to that same
component’s inputs. The return of these variants were not as
large as those of the ILP set, but far greater than the returns of
the random set suggesting favorable benefit from leveraging
feedback relationships in component selection.
This study presented several different selection algorithms
for implementing partial TMR in a circuit implemented on
an SRAM-based FPGA design. The objective in presenting
these algorithms was to test the hypothesis that greater benefit
from partial TMR can be gained by methodically selecting
portions of the circuit to replicate, specifically by selecting
areas that will protect the greatest number of routes and
require a minimum number of reduction voters. Random
selection was found to be ineffective. Replicating all com-
binational logic components significantly reduced the cross
section whereas replicating all sequential logic components
significantly increased the cross section. Replicating subsets
that maximize protected routes and minimize the number of
reduction provided the greatest return benefit of 2.27 for only
9% replication. Feedback-based selections also demonstrated
promising results.
V. PARTIAL DWC CASE STUDY
Another study was conducted that centered on applying
DWC in a partial manner to an FPGA-based networking
system. Terrestrial radiation, which originates from galactic
cosmic rays that enter the atmosphere or form contaminates in
the packaging material, can cause high performance network-
ing systems to fail. Radiation-induced failure in terrestrially
deployed network systems is very unlikely, but increased
occurrence in large-scale deployments [18] bring attention to
this issue. DWC is used in this study to improve a network
system’s awareness of radiation-induced persistent silent net-
work disruptions.
Radiation-induced upsets in CRAM can disrupt the flow
of network traffic in an FPGA-based networking system by
compromising the functionality of sub-components in the
system. Generally speaking, a network switch contains mul-
tiple independent streams of data, buffers, and control logic
for arbitration based on packet information. Each of these
constructs are implemented using primitive resources available
on the device. When radiation corrupts the configuration of
the device, the proper functionality of these constructs can
become compromised. Many high level protocols are put in
place to detect and respond to undesirable behavior but some
effects of radiation-upsets can remain undetected. One of the
most severe failure mode is the undetected loss of traffic flow
without recovery.
Partial DWC was applied in this study to regions of the
network system circuitry that were evaluated as more critical
based on targeted fault injection results. Ultimately, partial
DWC was applied to 29% of the network system’s FPGA
implemented circuit. Neutron radiation testing revealed that
this design variant was able to detect 45% of all persistent
silent network disruptions, which would otherwise go unno-
ticed. Another design variant, with DWC applied to 8% of
circuit components, was able to detect 31% of persistent silent
network disruptions induced through neutron radiation testing.
The following subsections cover the network system and test
setup, critical region evaluation, DWC implementation, and
the subsequent neutron beam tests with accompanying results.
A. Network System and Test Setup
The network system included in this study is a campus
backbone switch. This type of networking device typically
combines the networks of entire buildings across a wide area
as opposed to connecting individual computers together in a
single building or room. An enormous amount of data can be
processed through these systems. The studied system is built
for modular expansion. The chassis furnishes 16 networking
ports and each additional modular expansion furnishes an
additional 16 ports. Each group of 8 ports are paired with an
interface ASIC and an SRAM-based FPGA - a Virtex 7 330T.
The FPGA is responsible for a considerable portion of network
data processing and plays an essential role in connecting the
paired ports to the system and other available ports as a whole.
To mitigate network connectivity loss, these network sys-
tems are often configured with system-level redundancy and
switchover capability. In the unlikely event that connectivity
loss is sustained in a single system, the system-level redun-
dancy with switchover capability provides an alternate path
that can be used to complete the connection. Under this
configuration, persistent silent network loss in a single system
will have minimal impact. Higher level protocols will be able
to route traffic to the alternate path. This study uses DWC to
improve system awareness of persistent network loss to enable
faster repair times.
Figure 7 shows a diagram of the test setup used in fault
injection and neutron radiation testing. An external traffic
generator is used to generate network data to be used as
stimulus. The traffic generator also monitors the successful
delivery of those packets. Packets are transmitted and received
bidirectionally from each port connected to the traffic gen-
erator. The 16 ports on the modular network board under
test are configured to forward received traffic to an adjacent
port such that received data loops through each port until it
reaches its final destination. It is important to note that this
configuration causes traffic to travel through the backplane
of the device. This exercises more of the FPGA logic and
improves the coverage of the test. The FPGA on the board is
connected via JTAG to a custom configuration manager (JCM)
that monitors for radiation-induced upsets. The JCM can also
injects faults as needed for fault injection testing. The host
computer orchestrates the flow of the test and can monitor
and control both the traffic generator and the modular network








Fig. 7. Test Setup for Fault Injection and Radiation Testing
The presented test setup is used in tandem with a test flow
to collect data for evaluating the effectiveness of the applied
technique. Figure 8 present the test flow used for fault injection
testing, which resembles the flow of a typical fault injection
campaign [8]. First the system is brought into a working state.
Then a fault is injected into the CRAM of the FPGA that
implements the circuit under test. A set of diagnostic checks
are then made to determine if the system is still working
correctly. If it is, then the injected fault is repaired and a
subsequent fault is injected to continue the test. If the system
is not behaving correctly, the error is reported, the system is
rebooted to bring it back into a working state, and a subsequent
fault is injected to continue the test. This loop continues until











Fig. 8. Fault Injection Test Flow
A similar test flow was use for neutron radiation testing. In
neutron radiation testing, faults are not purposefully injected.
The neutron fluence is measured from the beginning of a test
run to a failure event. This fluence to failure measurement is
made for several samples of the same event, and that data is
then used to estimate the neutron cross section of the event.
B. Critical Region Evaluation
It is hypothesized that some areas in a circuit are more
important than others when it come to selecting which areas
of a circuit should be protected by partial DWC. SEUs can
occur anywhere in the device, but if they occur in areas where
the underlying circuity has the greatest responsibility to the
proper functionality of the system, then a failure outcome may
be more likely. This hypothesis suggests that the failure rate
of a circuit can be unevenly distributed across components
in a circuit. To maximize the error detection return (percent
of errors detected over percent of circuit replicated), selection
priority should be given to high risk regions.
Critical regions were evaluated for their proportional con-
tribution to the overall failure rate through fault injection.
Vendor tools were used to specify which subset of CRAM
bits were potentially used by different regions of the design.
These potentially used bits are known as essential bits [19].
Fault injection was used to evaluate four different regions: the
circuit as a whole, the packet reader (PR) module, the traffic
manager (TM) module, and the Interlaken (Inter) module.
Essential bits for sub regions were collected by removing all
other regions from the placed and routed design and then
regenerating the essential bits for the remaining placed and
routed subregion. Only the essential bit that intersected both
the original list and the regenerated list were used to filter out
minor changes in peripheral routing that were necessary for
bitstream generation. It is important to know that an upset in
an essential bit does not guarantee a failure, it only indicates
that the underlying circuit may be affected by an upset in the
bit.
Table II presents the results from the fault injection cam-
paigns. The first column presents the regions tested. The
second column designates the number of essential bits in
each region. Columns three and four show the number of
random fault injections in the region and the number of
observed failures respectively (randomly injected faults were
tested independent of each other). The fifth column shows the
sensitivity approximated by population sampling (failures over
faults injected). The final column presets the estimated number
of critical bits in the sampled region. Critical bits are bits that
if upset will cause failure with a high likelihood [19].
TABLE II







Design 27.1M 29624 360 1.2% 325.2K
PR 1.7M 3628 104 2.9% 49.3K
TM 2.1M 23402 467 2.0% 42.0K
Inter 4.9M 19627 435 2.2% 107.8K
The estimated number of critical bits in the sampled re-
gions can be used to estimate the distribution of the critical
bits among the regions of the circuit. Table III shows the
distribution of critical bits based on the resource utilization
and the number of estimated critical bits in each region. The
first and second columns show the evaluated critical region
and the percentage of the whole circuit that their resource
utilization makes up respectively. The “All 3” region combines
the PR, TM, and Iter regions of the design, which are mutually
exclusive. The “other” region evaluates the combination of
regions that are not included in the first three regions. Column
three presents the percentage of critical bits that reside in
each region. A 95% confidence interval is included with each
percentage. The final column presents the relative critical bit
density of each sub-region of the circuit.
TABLE III
DISTRIBUTION OF CRITICAL BITS





PR 6.1% 14.4±4.7% 2.36×
TM 7.7% 12.6±2.7% 1.63×
Inter 18% 32.9±7.1% 1.83×
All 3 31.8% 59.9±14.5% 1.88×
Other 68.2% 40.1±14.5% 0.59×
From this evaluation it can be seen that the PR region has
the most critical bits per resource utilization with a factor
of 2.36×. The TR and Inter also have elevated sensitivities
compared to the whole design, and the remaining portions
of the circuit have a lower sensitivity the circuit as a whole.
This evaluation suggests that applying DWC to all three of
the elevated regions would likely be able to detect about
60% of persistent silent network disruptions while requiring
duplication of only 32% of the circuit, which is a favorable
outcome.
C. Implementation
Partial DWC was applied to this circuit using a custom
electronic design automation (EDA) tool. The basic flow of
a circuit through this tool is shown in Figure 9. The circuit
originates in hardware description language (HDL) source
files. These are converted through logic synthesis into a netlist.
A netlist details the circuit’s components and connectivity.
This netlist is then supplied to the custom EDA tool. Here,
the user defined portions of the circuit are replicated and
supporting connections and detectors are added. The EDA
tool then produces an updated netlist that is supplied to
vendor tools for technology mapping, placement, and routing.











Fig. 9. Partial DWC Insertion Flow
Table IV shows the resource utilization of the respective
variations of the circuit. Three variation of the circuit are
examined in this study. First, the baseline without any redun-
dancy added to it is used as a reference point for comparison.
Second, a variant was made that duplicates large portions
of all three of the studied critical regions (PR, TM, and
Inter; about 90%). Finally, a third variant duplicated paths
between strongly connected components within the studied
critical regions. The number of slices, registers, lookup tables
(LUTs), block memories (BRAMs) are shown. The percentage
of components replicate and the number of required detector
pairs are also shown. Note that based on the accompanying
percentage of resource utilization (in parenthesis), it is not
possible to duplicate the entire design.
TABLE IV
PARTIAL DWC RESOURCE UTILIZATION
Virtex 7 330T Baseline Partial DWCPR/TM/INTER
Partial DWC
Between SCC
Slices 40,826 (80%) 49,016 (96%) 44,814 (88%)
Registers 136,766 (34%) 180,516 (44%) 152,106 (37%)
LUTs 99,165 (49%) 134,639 (66%) 113,278 (56%)
BRAMs 457.5 (61%) 569 (76%) 477 (64%)
DWC Coverage 0% 29% 8%
Detector Pairs 0 2,627 1,687
D. Neutron Beam Test and Results
Figure 10 shows the setup used at neutron testing of the
network system at the ChipIR experiment at the ISIS neutron
source of the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory in the United
Kingdom in March of 2019. One of the FPGAs in the system
was positioned perpendicular to the neutron flight path such
that the 2 inch collimated beam passes directly through the
device. The distance from the source to the targeted FPGA
was used to appropriately degrade the neutron flux at the
interception of the chip. Over a 36 hour period of testing a
total fluence of 4.5×109 n cm−2 was collected towards the
results.
Neutron Beam Flight Path
Fig. 10. Accelerated Neutron Beam Test Setup at ChipIR
Table V show the accuracy of partial DWC in neutron
testing for detecting otherwise undetectable persistent silent
network disruptions. The total observed upsets (SEUs) is
shown along with the total observed failures and the number
of failures that were detected by partial DWC. Partial DWC
applied to all three critical regions was able to detect 45%
of all observed failures, and partial DWC applied to critical
structures within those regions was able to detect 31% of all
observed failures. It is important to note that more than 50%
of detections reported by both versions were false detections
meaning that an actual failure did not occur. This is expected
behavior. Since only one of the replicas in a DWC scheme
drive the I/O of the circuit, any error in the redundant copy
will be flagged as a detection even though the error will not
affect the final output of the circuit.
TABLE V
PARTIAL DWC ACCURACY IN NEUTRON TESTING
Design Baseline Partial DWCPR/TM/INTER
Partial DWC
Between SCC
SEUs 459 675 1024
Total Failures 11 20 32
Detected Failures 0 9 10
Accuracy 0% 45% 31%
False Detection 0% 61% 58%
Table VI show the results from the neutron test. The number
of persistent network disruptions that were undetected are
listed in the second row. The fluence observed during the
respective tests is shown on the third row. The estimated
cross section with 95% confidence intervals is shown in the
fourth row, and the fifth row presents the FIT of undetected
failures (persistent silent network disruptions) adjusted to a
New York City reference neutron flux [11]. The confidence
intervals overlap between measurements. At face value, the
FIT of undetected failures is reduced considerably through the






















152 (74, 273) 106 (43, 169) 132 (77, 187)
In this study, DWC was applied to critical regions of
a commercial FPGA-based campus backbone switch. The
distribution of the circuits failure rate was evaluated through
fault injection. Some areas were found to be more sensitive
than other such as the PR module, which was 2.7× more
likely to result in failure should a random upset occur in this
region of the circuit. DWC was applied to all three evaluated
regions. A coverage of 29% was able to detect 45% of all
otherwise undetectable failures and a coverage of 8% (a subset
within the evaluated regions) was able to detect 31% of all
otherwise undetectable failures. The results suggest significant
improvement in the system’s ability to detect these otherwise
undetectable errors through the use of partial DWC.
VI. CONCLUSION
Three partial circuit replication studies are presented in
this work. The first study examines the reliability model of
partial circuit replication (more specifically partial TMR).
This study finds that the reliability benefit of partial circuit
replication is inversely related to the portion of the original
failure rate that is protected through partial circuit replication.
Benefit is greatest when a very large portion of the original
failure rate is protected. The second study examines several
selection algorithms for the application of partial TMR. This
study finds that random selection does not improve reliability.
Maximizing protected routes and minimizing the insertion of
reduction voters was able to reduce the original failure rate
by 20% while only replicating 9% of the circuit. The final
study used partial circuit replication to improve the detection
of radiation-induced network outages in an SRAM FPGA-
based networking application. Partial DWC of 29% of circuit
components was able to detect 45% of persistent network
outages and partial DWC of 8% of circuit components was
able to detect 31% of outages as demonstrated through neutron
radiation testing. All in all, these three studies demonstrate
some of the benefits of partial circuit replication and advance
the state of the art understanding and implementation of partial
TMR and partial DWC.
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